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Abstract
The goal of this study is to explore the economic conditions that favor the joint
development of therapeutics and companion diagnostics. I hypothesize that predictive
biomarkers can generate economic value in drug development by increasing success
rates. I construct an economic model of the development of a hypothetical new therapy,
and devote particular attention to parameters regarding safety, efficacy, cost, and market
size, within a decision-theoretic framework.
The results include a characterization of the dynamic net present value trade-offs
between stratum size and biomarker success, as well as the identification of two
complementary concepts of stratified medicine, namely, disease reclassification and
value-based reimbursement. I also identify a strong potential incentive mechanism in the
hands of public policy makers that could facilitate a resolution of the tension between
patient interests and the interests of pharmaceutical sponsors.
The conclusion is that a biomarker can compensate for smaller sratum by
increasing success probabilities. However, the effects of longer development time due to
biomarker inclusion counter the effects of improved success probabilities. Longer
exclusivity periods for stratified medicine may be required in order to resolve the tension
between patient interests and the interests of pharmaceutical sponsors.
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Background
Stratified medicine' as opposed to empirical medicine is the practice of using
biomarkers or diagnostic tests to guide the choice of therapeutic treatments. In a simple
case, a predictive diagnostic test stratifies the patient population to responders and non-
responders for a certain treatment, where by contrast, in empirical medicine all patients
would receive the same treatment. By stratifying the diagnostic test helps increase
efficacy 2 3 and/or reduce toxicity4 in the treated stratum but at the same time it reduces
the addressable patient population for the treatment within a predefined disease space.
For example, a more effective and safe medicine that would better serve the interests of
patients would have this effect only in a small number of the patients with the disease it
was designed to address. As a result, if the approved indication of this medicine is limited
to the better responding stratum, the sponsor that develops the medicine would face a
smaller market size, other things being equal.
Figure 1 - Stratification Tension
Market
Size
Efficacý/
Safety
This double pronged effect would, in principle, create tension between patient
interests and the interests of pharmaceutical sponsors, as is illustrated in Figure 1 -
Stratification Tension. The vertical axis represents market size while the horizontal axis
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represents efficacy and/or safety. The function line represents a continuum of market
size, safety and efficacy combinations. Stratified medicine is demonstrated relative to
empirical medicine by transition on the continuum from a point of larger market size with
lower efficacy or safety to a point of smaller market size with higher safety or efficacy.
Review of the Literature
Stratified medicine 5 has previously been dubbed personalized medicine,
pharmacogenomics, pharmacogenetics, prognostic diagnostics, or in short PgX, and also
predictive or companion diagnostics. A predictive biomarker or diagnostic can predict
response to therapy in which case it is defined as an efficacy biomarker. It can predict
non-response in which case it is defined as a non-response biomarker. And finally, it can
predict adverse reaction in which case it is defined as a safety biomarker.
Stratified medicine's promise of better therapies has inspired research regarding
its economic value for society. Webster et al.6 identified several potential applications for
a predictive biomarker: First, it can be used to discover better drugs. Second, it can
improve the safety of new drugs in development. Third, it can improve the efficacy of
new drugs in development. Fourth, it can improve the safety of licensed drugs post-
market, and fifth, it can improve the efficacy of licensed drugs post market. Phillips and
Van Bebber's systematic review 7 documented that the cost-effectiveness of specific PGx
tests will depend on many factors, including gene and disease prevalence, gene
penetrance, and test sensitivity, specificity, and cost as well as individual preferences8.
Phillips and Van Bebber9 also concluded that crucial data for assessing the value of PGx
with regard to its impact on clinical practice and outcomes are currently lacking.
The clinical utility of a predictive biomarker increases with the toxicity of the
treatment and decreases with the efficacy of the treatment'i . For example, a drug that is
very effective for almost all patients with no side effects would not be a good
stratification candidate. On the other hand, a toxic drug with limited efficacy may require
stratification for toxicity, efficacy or both. The prevalence of the disease and relative size
of the stratum also affect the value of a predictive biomarker' 1. For example, if the better
responding stratum is expected to be very small it might not justify the development of a
diagnostic test and the ongoing testing of the full patient population. Severity of the
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disease affects what type of biomarker, safety, efficacy or non-response is most clinically
beneficial.
Other research has focused on the adoption of companion diagnostics by industry
and the incentives that exist for their development. Robertson et al.' 2, Webster et al.", and
Califf 4 concluded that most large pharmaceutical companies focus their PGx investments
on improving the efficiency of drug development, and that they have limited interest and
incentive for PGx investments for currently marketed medicines". Danzon and Towse' 6
argued that current marketplace incentives, particularly drug price inflexibility once a
drug is launched, give manufacturers little commercial motivation to invest in biomarkers
that would result in a narrower indication' 7. Garrison and Austin"' suggested that health
system reforms that promote value based, rather than cost based, flexible reimbursement
for innovative, patent-protected diagnostic and therapeutic products are critical to create
stronger economic incentives for the development of personalized medicine. Seiguer 19
also concluded that there is very little if any incentive for industry to invest in companion
diagnostics. Trusheim et al.20 pointed out the risks for industry in continuing to pursue an
unsustainable blockbuster model. They also identified a few compensation mechanisms
that financially offset smaller strata due to improved safety and efficacy. For example,
higher price, better compliance and increased market share within a stratum can offset the
effect of a smaller market size on revenues. In addition, when the decision to stratify is
made a priori, clinical trials can potentially be both smaller and shorter, which can
improve a drug development project net present value (NPV) through lower investment
and shorter time to revenues. On the other hand, more narrowly defined inclusion criteria
may lead to lengthier recruiting, the need for additional sites, and higher costs.
Trusheim et al. also broadened the discussion on stratified medicine by defining
clinical biomarkers to include any diagnostic test or clinical observation that indicates a
preferred or contraindicated treatment for a patient subpopulation. Such tests can be
based on gene expression patterns, individual proteins, proteomic patterns,
metabonomics, histology, imaging, physicians' clinical observations and even self-
reported patient surveys. In other words, they define a clinical biomarker not by its
technology or biological basis, but rather by its reliable, predictive statistical correlation
with differential patient responses.
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The incremental value of U.S. medical spending has been decreasing as evidenced
by the continual increase in cost per year of life gained 21. At the same time it has been
recognized that there is a pharmaceutical R&D productivity problem 22 23 as evidenced by
the -50% increase of investment per successful compound24 . One of the possible causes
for this productivity problem is the decline in drug development success rates for new
molecular entities entering clinical development from 14% in the late 90's to 8% in the
period 2000-200225
In this study I hypothesize that predictive biomarkers can generate economic
value in drug development by increasing success rates. I construct an economic model of
the development of a new therapy, and devote particular attention to parameters
regarding safety, efficacy, cost and market size, within a decision-theoretic framework.
Methodology
I begin with a baseline economic model that compares the Net Present Value
(NPV) of a stratified medicine case with that of an empirical medicine case. The model is
populated with numbers from the literature26 27. I conclude, as others have before me28 29
that there is little if any economic incentive for drug developers to make stratification
decisions a priori. The reason is that even when the stratified medicine has a superior risk
adjusted NPV, its success NPV is still inferior to that of the empirical medicine. This is
important since risk adjusted NPV, which is a weighted average of failure NPV and
success NPV, does not represent an actual outcome. In reality the firm would get either
the success NPV or the failure NPV. Consequently, a firm would be likely to keep an
option for the full market with the larger success NPV rather than limit itself up front to a
stratum with lower success NPV. In cases where both the success NPV and risk adjusted
NPV are superior for the stratified medicine it is clear that stratification is the better
alternative. This outcome may occur when the stratum is relatively large and other
offsetting mechanisms exist such as shorter clinical trials, higher price for the marketed
drug, better compliance and higher share within the stratum 30 such as in the case of
imatinib mesylate (Gleevec: Novartis, Switzerland). In this study I focus on cases where
the success NPV for the stratified medicine is inferior to that of the full population since
those are the ambiguous cases that call for clarification of the economic dynamics.
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In addition to these economic considerations for not stratifying upfront, the
availability of strata for a given treatment is rarely known early in the development
process. Rather, in most cases it is one possible outcome of clinical trials that combine
hypothetical stratifying biomarkers. Consequently, I ask, rather than upfront
stratification, what is the value of having the option to stratify as a fall back or as a
project salvage option? In other words, what are the drivers and conditions that justify the
investment in companion diagnostics as stratification options"?
In order to answer this question I add a decision analysis32 layer of complexity to
the model. This stochastic layer adds the success probability over development phases as
demonstrated in Figure 2 - Companion Diagnostic Decision Tree. Based on the decision
analysis model I conduct sensitivity analyses that are the basis for the results reported in
this study.
In order to validate the model and the results, I also conduct qualitative interviews
with some of the stakeholders including personnel in academia, at the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, and in industry. Some of the interviews were the result of a
predefined set of cases but most were based on networking with key representatives of
the above stakeholders.
Biomedical Enterprise Master Thesis, Amir Goren 10/39
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Model
The following decision trees represent comparisons between two approaches. The
first approach is that of stratified medicine, which uses companion diagnostics as "real
options" 33 in a drug development hedging strategy. The second approach is that of
empirical medicine, which does not use biomarkers.
Figure 2 - Companion Diagnostic Decision Tree - Efficacy Biomarker
$575.2M
S875M
-$124.2M
5669 2M
=1,125M
-$115..6M
S1 199M
-5111M
In Figure 2 - Companion Diagnostic Decision Tree - Efficacy Biomarker, the
lower tree branch ("No") represents empirical medicine where the probabilities of
success and failure in each clinical phase are the average industry probabilities. The
outcomes are based on average clinical phase costs and on the assumption of $1B peak
revenues. In the upper branch ("Yes"), more alternatives are generated by the use of
biomarkers. Instead of only success or failure, stratified success or biomarker success is
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an additional salvage alternative, whose probability is deducted from the failure
probability. The outcomes at the end of each branch are the result of a sequence of
clinical and financial scenarios. For example, the first outcome on this tree is an NPV of
$575.2 million, which is a result of a decision to use an efficacy biomarker, identification
of a valid biomarker in phase I, success in the full population in phase II and success only
in the stratum in phase III. The overall probability for this outcome is 3%
(25%X49.7%X25%) and hence, the contribution of this possible outcome to the overall
NPV of the decision to use an efficacy biomarker is 3%X$575M=$17.9M.
Figure 3 - Companion Diagnostic Decision Tree - Safety Biomarker
$575 2M
5875M
-5124.2M
S$669.2M
-$119.3M
$753M
-$1i15.6M
$1199M
-5111M
--4;
In Figure 3 - Companion Diagnostic Decision Tree - Safety Biomarker, for
example, the second outcome is an NPV of $875 million, which is a result of a decision
to use safety biomarker, identification of a valid biomarker in phase I, success in the full
population in phase II and success in the full population in phase III. The overall
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probability for this outcome is 25.5% (77.3%X49.8%X66.3%) and hence, the
contribution of this possible outcome to the overall NPV of the decision to use an
efficacy biomarker is 25.5%X$875M=$223.3M.
The structures of the decision trees incorporate a number of assumptions,
especially regarding the stratified medicine cases. These structural and other base case
assumptions are specified here, but in the results section I also report findings from some
sensitivity analyses in which I modify these structural assumptions.
Structural Assumptions
1) The decision point in time, which is the analysis reference point, is just prior to the
clinical development stage.
2) In clinical phase I the biomarker is identified. The assumption is that patient
enrichment is implemented for a safety biomarker and that a phase IB study is
performed for an efficacy biomarker. The implication is that the time and cost of
clinical phase I are increased relative to a phase I without stratification (assumed to be
120% in the baseline scenario and subject to a sensitivity analysis).
3) "Biomarker success" in phase I means either transition to phase II with an identified
efficacy biomarker or transition to phase II only with an identified stratum based on a
safety biomarker. The probability of such an event is deducted from the overall
probability of success in the case of an efficacy biomarker and from the overall
probability of failure in the case of a safety biomarker. In Figure 2 - Companion
Diagnostic Decision Tree - Efficacy Biomarker, the 25% biomarker success
probability is circled and called "stratum pass". It reduces the full market success
probability in phase I from 77.3% to 52.3%. In Figure 3 - Companion Diagnostic
Decision Tree - Safety Biomarker, the 15% success probability is circled and called
stratum pass. In this case it reduces the failure probability in phase I from 22.7% to
7.7% due to the ability of a safety biomarker to "save" a phase I trial.
4) If phase I is successful but no efficacy biomarker is identified, then the phase II and
III studies continue as in the empirical medicine case. If phase I is successful but only
in a stratum defined by a safety biomarker, phase II and III continue as in the
empirical medicine case but result in smaller stratum revenues.
Biomedical Enterprise Master Thesis, Amir Goren 13/39
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If, however, phase I is successful for the full population with an identified biomarker,
then:
5) Phase II time and cost are increased relative to the empirical medicine case (assumed
to be 120% in the baseline scenario and subject to a sensitivity analysis) in order to
power both for the full population and for the potential stratum.
6) Phase II "biomarker success" or "stratum pass" represents transition to phase III but
only with a responding stratum as identified by the biomarker. The probability of
such an event is deducted from the failure probability.
7) If phase II is successful only in the biomarker defined stratum, phase III continues as
in the empirical medicine case.
8) If phase II is successful for the full population, phase III time and cost are increased
relative to the empirical medicine case (assumed to be 120% in the baseline scenario
and subject to a sensitivity analysis) in order to power both for the full population and
for the potential stratum.
9) Phase III "biomarker success" or "stratum pass" represents transition to marketing but
only with a responding stratum as identified by the biomarker. The probability of
such an event is deducted, again, from the failure probability.
Financial Assumptions
The outcome at each end node is computed through a financial scenario. These
scenarios can be found in Appendix 2 - Scenarios. The data that is shared between the
scenarios and data related assumptions can be found in Appendix 1 - Data (DiMasi et al.
200334 and 200735, all recalculated in 2005 dollars).
The baseline peak revenues for the empirical medicine are chosen to be $1B to
represent a typical "blockbuster". Following one common convention used in venture
capital', I use the following formula to assess the peak revenue value multiple: Multiple =
1.5 + (years of exclusivity/2). I assume that it takes five years from launch to reach peak
revenues and that for empirical medicine it leaves seven years of patent exclusivity
resulting in a peak revenue multiple of five (1.5+7/2 = 5). This multiple is consistent with
1 Personal communication: Dr. Thomas Roberts (Noonday Asset Management, NC)
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the value paid by pharmaceutical companies to acquire new products in several recent
acquisitions. In the biomarker arm of the model, lengthier development time in the
baseline case results in less exclusivity time and longer time to peak revenues. This in
turn, results in lower present values of revenues for the biomarker arm. A sensitivity
analysis for the effect of time is discussed later in the results section.
Results
The hypothesis of this study is that predictive biomarkers can generate economic
value in drug development by reducing failure rates. In order to qualitatively assess the
ability of a predictive, stratifying biomarker to generate value that offsets the effect of a
smaller market I also perform the following sensitivity analyses. Both the biomarker
success probability and the relative size of stratum in revenues (% peak revenues) are
allowed to change while all other factors are held constant. The result is the advantage,
negative or positive, for the stratified medicine approach over the empirical approach
computed as the stratified NPV less the empirical NPV.
Figure 4 - Sensitivity Analysis - Efficacy Biomarker
Biomarker NPV Advantage
"Break Even" Lii
80%
70%
60%
Stratum Revenues
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In Figure 4 - Sensitivity Analysis - Efficacy Biomarker, the trade-off between
biomarker success and stratum revenues can be visualized, as I now describe. Lower
stratum revenues (Y axis, right side) reduce the biomarker NPV advantage (Z axis, left
side) while higher biomarker success (X axis, bottom) increase biomarker NPV
advantage. The breakeven line shows the trade-off for zero biomarker NPV advantage.
For example, if stratum revenues are expected to be 50% of full market revenues one
would have to assume an above 27% efficacy biomarker success in order to justify the
additional investment in a biomarker (based on a positive biomarker NPV advantage).
Figure 5 - Sensitivity Analysis - Safety Biomarker
$120
$100
$60
$40
$20
$-
$(20)
$(40)
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$(80)
80%
7%
10%
Biomarker Success
12%
15% 20%
50%
40%
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In Figure 5 - Sensitivity Analysis - Safety Biomarker, the trade-off between
biomarker success and stratum revenues can also be visualized, as I now describe. Lower
stratum revenues (Y axis, right side) reduce the biomarker NPV advantage (Z axis, left
Biomedical Enterprise Master Thesis, Amir Goren
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side) while higher biomarker success (X axis, bottom) increase biomarker NPV
advantage. The break even line shows the trade-off for zero biomarker NPV advantage.
For example, if stratum revenues are expected to be 50% of full market revenues one
would have to assume an above 16% efficacy biomarker success in order to justify the
additional investment in a biomarker (based on a positive biomarker NPV advantage).
Tables 1 and 2 below summarize the trade-off between stratum revenues and
biomarker success along the above breakeven lines.
Table 1 - Efficacy Biomarker Breakeven NPV
Stratum Revenues Biomarker Success Required to Balance NPVs
80% 19%
70% 21%
60% 23%
50% 27%
40% NA
Table 2 - Safety Biomarker Breakeven NPV
Stratum Revenues Biomarker Success Required to Balance NPVs
80% 9%
70% 10.5%
60% 13%
50% 16%
40% NA
Note: NA means Not Applicable
Along the breakeven line, between the 50% and 80% stratum revenues, the arc
elasticity of efficacy biomarker success with respect to stratum revenues is about -0.75,
i.e., a 10% proportional increase in the stratum revenue percentage is associated with a
7.5% proportional decrease in the required biomarker success probability. In
comparison, the analogous arc elasticity of safety biomarker success with respect to
stratum revenues is larger (in absolute value) at about -1.2, i.e. a 10% proportional
increase in the stratum revenue is associated with a 12% proportional decrease in the
Biomedical Enterprise Master Thesis, Amir Goren 17/39
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required safety biomarker success probability. Hence, in terms of required biomarker
success to offset revenue loss, the safety biomarker is more elastic than the efficacy
biomarker.
The results support the hypotheses that a predictive stratifying biomarker can
generate economic value by reducing failure rates through a project salvage option.
Moreover, these results, and especially the break even line trade-offs, demonstrate the
conditions that are required for such value to be created, thereby serving as a guideline
for justifying investment in stratifying biomarkers on a case by case basis. The biomarker
success probability that is required to balance stratum revenues reduction for a safety
biomarker is much smaller than that required for an efficacy biomarker. This is due to the
ability of a safety biomarker to "save" a project starting in clinical phase I where an
efficacy biomarker can only begin "saving" in phase II. Neither a safety nor an efficacy
biomarker can balance an above 50% reduction in revenues due to stratification under the
assumptions of this study.
Figure 6 - Efficacy Biomarker Success Impact (at 60% Stratum Revenues)
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As is evident from Figure 6, the relationship between biomarker success
probabilities and biomarker NPV advantage is almost linear. Every one percent of
biomarker success yields approximately $2.4M of biomarker NPV advantage.
In Figure 7, the relationship between stratum revenues (as a percent of full market
revenues) is linear with every one percent in stratum revenues yielding $0.775M. Around
these values for an efficacy biomarker (60% stratum revenues and 25% biomarker
success), one percent in biomarker success probability just offsets approximately three
percent in stratum revenues. The linearity seems to be inherent to the model.
Figure 7 - Stratum Revenues Impact
(Efficacy Biomarker with 25% Success Probability)
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These results turn out to be very sensitive to increases in clinical phase time but
less so to increases in clinical phase cost. As demonstrated in Figure 8, biomarker NPV
advantage (Z axis, right side) drops drastically with increases in clinical phase time
(bottom). For example, an increase in the costs of clinical phases by 30% (from zero
when phase time increase is held at 20%) reduces the NPV advantage from $12M to zero
while an increase in the time duration of clinical phases by 30% (from zero when phase
cost increase is held at 20%) reduces the NPV advantage from $50M to minus $18M.
Figure 8 - Sensitivity to Increases in Clinical Phase Time and Cost
(Efficacy Biomarker with 60% Stratum Revenues and 25% Biomarker Success)
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This NPV reduction is mainly due to the longer time to revenues and shorter
exclusivity period following peak in revenues. Under the assumption that companion
diagnostics require increased statistical power in order to allow retrospective
stratification, a delay in the marketing of the drug and a similar delay in peak revenues
are assumed to occur. These delays shorten the exclusivity time post peak revenues
(under the assumption that patent applications deadlines and lifetimes remain unchanged)
and hence reduce the peak revenues valuation.
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As is evident from Figure 9 - Clinical Phase Time Impact, the relationship
between clinical phase time increases and biomarker NPV advantage is essentially linear.
Every one percent of phase time increase results in an approximately $2.5M reduction in
biomarker NPV advantage.
Figure 9 - Clinical Phase Time Impact
(25% Efficacy Biomarker Success and 60% Stratum Revenues)
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Validation
In order to gain further support for my principal hypothesis and to validate the
results of the model, I conduct a series of interviews with officials from academia, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and industry. The interview summaries can
be found in Appendix 4 - Interviews.
From these interviews it is clear that some incentives do in fact exist for industry
to use predictive biomarkers in drug development. Both payers and the FDA are requiring
developers to improve efficacy and safety as a condition for financial returns, whether it
is through regulatory approval or reimbursement. And indeed, many firms, e.g.
AstraZeneca (Waltham MA), and Millenium Pharmaceuticals (Cambridge MA) are
already employing predictive stratifying biomarkers as project salvage options in an
attempt to reduce failures and possibly shrink phase III trials. An interesting observation
from an interview with Millenium Pharmaceuticals is that non-response biomarkers may
be more useful and valuable than response biomarkers. This is particularly evident in
oncology where the efficacy bar is low and toxicity is high, and where it is difficult to
exclude such patients unless it is almost certain that they will not respond.
In addition, competitive pressures, for example, Tarceva (Genetech CA) in the
case of AstraZeneca's Iressa and fi-om CellGene's Revlimid in the case of Millenimum's
Velcade, also point out the possible risks that can arise with the lack of any clinically
stratifying biomarker.
Diagnostic companies appear to have incentives to develop post-market predictive
safety biomarkers for approved treatments (e.g. Genomas, CT 2). Another diagnostic
business model is the development of predictive markers for treatment monitoring (e.g.
Veridex NJ and Immincon PA 3).
A refreshing view of stratified medicine as a transitional step on the road to
reclassification of disease came up in my interviews with Merrimack Pharmaceuticals
(Cambridge, MA) and AstraZeneca (Waltham, MA). Instead of viewing a predictive
2 PhyzioTypeTM system for DNA based adverse events prediction
3 CellSearchTM system for monitoring response to chemotherapy based on circulating
tumor cells
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biomarker as market limiting, they view it as market defining as illustrated in the
following diagram. The disease space of solid tumors is traditionally divided by tissue of
origin. A solid tumor medicine has traditionally been required to focus on one tissue of
origin as an indication. Stratified medicine adds a molecular dimension based on which it
further divides a traditionally defined disease space into responding and non-responding
strata or marker positive and marker negative strata. The result is better medicine for a
smaller market. Disease reclassification goes further by using the molecular dimension
instead of traditional classifications such as site of origin and solid vs. hematological. The
result is better medicine for a molecularly defined condition across many different
traditionally defined diseases.
Figure 10 - Stratification vs. Reclassification
Marker vs.
Traditional
Definition
Marker Negative
Marker Positive
Solid Tumors
Breast Colon Prostate
cz2
As illustrated in Figure 10, while the stratified medicine approach is using a
biomarker to segment a predefined space, reclassification is using the same biomarker to
define a new space across traditional boundaries.
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Discussion and Implications
In general, the results of this study are supportive of the hypothesis that predictive
biomarkers can generate economic value by reducing failure rates in drug development.
However, the threshold conditions that are required for justifying a biomarker are quite
high, especially for efficacy biomarkers, as described in Table 1 - Efficacy Biomarker
Breakeven NPV. Moreover, the relationship between both stratum revenues as a share of
full market revenues and biomarker NPV advantage appears to be essentially linear as
does the relationship between biomarker success probability and biomarker NPV
advantage. Every one percent in biomarker success probability translates into
approximately $2.4M in biomarker NPV advantage while every one percent of stratum
revenues translates into $0.775M. Consequently, around the intersection of 60% stratum
revenues and 25% biomarker success probability, the balancing trade-off is around one
percent of biomarker success for every three percent of stratum revenues.
In addition, the results are very sensitive to increases in clinical phase time due to
longer time to revenues and shorter exclusivity period following peak revenues, as
described in Figure 8. This sensitivity is perhaps the major significant finding of this
study since it points to a strong potential incentive mechanism in the hands of public
policy makers that could facilitate a resolution of the aforementioned tension between
patient interests and the interests of biopharmaceutical sponsors. Longer exclusivity
periods36 37 for stratified medicines would dramatically change the economics in favor of
biomarker adoption. As evident from Figure 9 - Clinical Phase Time Impact, the
relationship between clinical phase time increase and biomarker NPV advantage is
essentially linear. Every one percent in phase time increase results in approximately
$2.5M reduction in biomarker NPV advantage.
One possible policy implication is that the Congress may want to consider a
biomarker exclusivity extension provision analogous to the pediatric extension provision
whereby branded patent holders gain an extra six months of market exclusivity by
conducting efficacy trials on pediatric populations.
In summary, the dynamic trade-offs appear to be that increases in biomarker
success probability balance three fold decreases in stratum revenues. However, similar
Biomedical Enterprise Master Thesis, Amir Goren 24/39
Economic Case for Stratified Medicine
increases in clinical phase time appear to counter the positive effect of a biomarker on
NPV. In other words, the increase in success probability has to be greater than the
increase in clinical phase time in order to balance smaller strata revenues.
Two complementary concepts for stratified medicine emerge from the validation
interviews. The first is reclassification of disease that is illustrated in Figure 10 -
Stratification vs. Reclassification. Disease reclassification goes further than stratified
medicine by using the molecular dimension instead of the traditional organ-by-organ
classification. The result is superior medicine for a molecularly defined condition across
multiple traditionally defined diseases. This is a more attractive model financially but its
applicability might well be limited to the pharmacology of oncology.
The second concept is value based reimbursement 38 demonstrated recently by the
agreement39 between J&J (Raritan NJ) and UK's National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (NICE) involving Velcade (Millenium Pharmaceuticals, Cambridge MA).
According to the agreement J&J will be paid only for responding patients. Such value
based reimbursement can be viewed both as an alternative to efficacy biomarkers and
also as an incentive mechanism for their development. However, since manufacturing
costs tend to be relatively low, even in large molecules, it is my judgment that such
models will weigh on the disincentive side of biomarker development since they provide
a "salvage" option without the additional investment in a biomarker.
The results of this study should be interpreted in the context of its limitations.
These limitations include investigation only of the $1B peak revenues for the empirical
medicine. Another factor that I have not taken into account in this study is manufacturing
capacity in the case of biologics40. Since by FDA regulatory requirements the full
manufacturing capacity for a large molecule often has to be available before phase III
trials can begin, it may change the results in favor of stratifying biomarkers.
As further research I suggest computing the nested real option value of a
biomarker. For example, investment in phase I biomarker buys one an option to invest in
a phase II biomarker. Since the value of options is positively correlated both with
uncertainty and "time to expiration" it is plausible that the value of early investment in a
predictive biomarker, for example, in phase I, can be more fully appreciated through a
full real option calculation. In phase I the "time to expiration" is still long and the
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uncertainties regarding the value of the "underlying assets", that in this case are the
salvage options to stratify in phase II and phase III, are high. I also suggest examining
biologics separately, taking into account the investment in manufacturing as part of phase
III trials.
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Appendix 1 - Data
Table 3 - Data and Estimates
Cost of
11%
Biotech Cost Pharma Cost Average Annualized Present
Phase ($M)** ($M)*** Cost ($M)A Cost ($M)AA ValueAAA
Phase I $32.28 $17.18 $24.73 $18.66 ($24-32)
Phase II $37.69 $26.56 $32.12 $13.94 ($26.18)
Phase III $96.09 $97.52 $96.80 $34.83 ($60.59)
Average Previous
Biotech Pharma Phase Average Clinical
Phase length Phase length length Phase length Development
Phase**** (mos.) (mos.) (mos.)A (years) (years)
Phase I 19.5 12.3 15.9 1.3 0.0
Phase II 29.3 26 27.7 2.3 1.3
Phase III 32.9 33.8 33.4 2,8 3.6
FDA 16 18.2 17. 1 1.4 6.4
Total 94.0 7.8 7.8
Success Success Average
Phase***** Probability Probability Success
Phase I 84% 71% 77%
Phase II 56% 44% 50%
Phase III 64% 69% 66%
Total 30% 21% 26%
* DiMasi et al. 2003 Table 2
** DiMasi and Grabowski 2007 Table I
*** DiMasi et al. 2003 Table I and Bureau of Economic Analysis 2007 Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product
**** DiMasi and Grabowski 2007 Figure 2
***** DiMasi and Grabowski 2007 Figure 1
A Average is a simple average between biotech and pharina
^^ Anualized cost is average cost divided by length of phase in years
^^^ Present value is the value of the cost as an annuity at the beginning of each phase, discounted to time zero
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Appendix 2 - Scenarios
Table 4 - Efficacy Biomarker Outcomes
Empirical Stratified: El All the Way S2 S3
Peak Revenues (M) $ 1.0_00 _70% $1,000 $ 1,006 $ s 700
Multiple 5.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.4
Cost of capital 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
TTM (years) 7.8 8. 1 9.1 8.6 9.1
Time to Peak (years) 5 0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Exclusivity years left (years) 7.0 6.7 5.7 6.3 5.7
Revenues PV $ 1,310 $ 1,241 $ 999 $ 788 $ 699
Outcome PVs Empirical Stratum Increase
Phase 1 Cost PV $ (24) $ (29) $ (29) $ (29) $ (29)
Phase 2 Cost PV $ (26) $ (26) $ (30) $ (30) $ (30)
Phase 3 Cost PV $ (61) $ (61) $ (66) $ (61) $ (66)
Outcome PV $ 1,199 $ 1,125 $ 875 $ 669 $ 575
El - success with failed validation of biomarker in clinical phase I
S2 - success with stratification in clinical phase II
S3 - success with stratification in clinical phase III
All the way - success with no stratification
TTM - Time to Market
Table 5 - Efficacy Biomarker NPV
NPV
Advantage
Outcomes Empirical Stratified to Stratify
Probabilities Cumulative PV Outcome Probabilities Cumulative PV Outcome
Phase 1 Fail 23% 23% $ (24) 23% 22.7% $ (29)
Phase 1 Success no biomarker 52%
Phase 1 Success biomarker 25%
Phase 2 Fail El 50% 38% $ (51) 30% 15.7% $ (55)
Phase 2 Success El 50%
Phase 2 Fail B1 25% 6.3% $ (59)
Phase 2 Success Stratum B 1 25%0,
Phase 2 Success full B1 50%
Phase 3 Fail El E2 34% 13% $ (111) 34% 8.9% $ (116)
Phase 3 Success El E2 66% 26% $ 1,199 66% 17.5% $ 1,125
Phase 3 Fail BI E2 9% 1.1% $ (124)
Phase 3 Success Bi E2 66% 8.3% $ 875
Phase 3 Stratum Success BI E2 25% 3.1% $ 575 17.89
Phase 3 Fail B S2 34% 2.1% $ (119)
Phase3 Stratum Success B1 S2 66% 4.1% $ 669
Net Present Value 100.00% $ 270 89.66% $ 281 $ 12
El - after failure to identify a valid biomarker in clinical phase I
E2 - after success in the full population in clinical phase II
BI - after successful identification of a valid biomarker in clinical phase I
S2 - after stratification in clinical phase II
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Table 6 - Safety Biomarker Outcomes
Empircal Stratified: SI All the Way 2 3
Peak Revenues (M) 1,0 ." 700 $ 1,000 $ 700 $ 700
Multiple 5.0 4.9 4.4 4.6 4.4
Cost of capital 1I 11% 11% 11%
TTM (years) 7.8 8.1 9.1 8.6 9.1
Time to Peak (years) 5. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0
Exclusivity years left (years) 7.0 6.7 5.7 6.3 5.7
Revenues PV $ 1,310 $ 868 $ 999 $ 788 $ 699
Outcome PVs Empirical Stratum Increase
Phase I Cost PV $ (24) $ (29) $ (29) $ (29) $ (29)
Phase 2 Cost PV $ (26) $ (26) $ (30) $ (30) $ (30)
Phase 3 Cost PV $ ( (61) (61) $ (66) $ (61) $ (66)
OutcomePV $ 1,199 $ 753 $ 875 $ 669 $ 575
SI - success with stratification in clinical phase I
S2 - success with stratification in clinical phase II
S3 - success with stratification in clinical phase Ill
All the way - success with no stratification
TTM - Time to Market
Table 7 - Safety Biomarker NPV
S1 - after stratification in clinical phase I
S2 - after stratification in clinical phase II
El - after success in the full population in clinical phase I
E2 - after success in the full population in clinical phase II
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NPV
Advantage
Outcomes Empirical Stratified to Stratify
Probabilities Cumulative PV Outcome Probabilities Cumulative PV Outcome
Phase I Fail 23% 23/% $ (24) -2.4% -2% $ (29)
Phase 1 Success 77.4%
Phasel Success stratified 25%
Phase 2 Fail Sl 50% 38% $ (51) 49.8% 12% $ (55)
Phase 2 Success SI 50.3%
Phase 2 Fail El 25.3% 20% $ (59)
Phase 2 Success Stratum 25.0%
Phase 2 Success full 49.8%
Phase 3 Fail Sl 34% 13% S (111) 33.7% 4% $ (116)
Phase 3 Success S1 66% 26% S 1,199 66.4% 8% $ 753
Phase 3 Fail El E2 8.7% 3.3% $ (124)
Phase 3 Success El E2 66.4% 26% $ 875
Phase 3 Stratum Success El E2 25.0% 10% $ 575
Phase 3 Fail El S2 33.7% 6.5% $ (119)
Phase 3 Stratum Success El S2 66.4% 13% $ 669
Net Present Value 100.00% $ 270 100.00% $ 393 $ 123
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Appendix 3 - Validation Questionnaire
What is your view of "stratified medicine"? How does it tie into your
strategy?
What are the drivers and incentives for "stratified medicine"?
What are the inhibitors, disincentives and alternatives?
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What was the "case" biomarker?
When was the biomarker discovered? At what stage of the drug
development?
What was the biomarker business case? Efficacy, safety, perceived
success probability?
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Appendix 4 - Interviews
FDA
Dr. Federico Goodsaid, Genomics Group, Office of Clinical Pharmacology, Office of
Translational Science, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Conference Call, May 18 2007
1) Toxicity biomarker development can be justified even post marketing in order to
prevent Vioxx like cases.
2) Reduced revenues may be a negative incentive for developing efficacy biomarkers
but not for toxicity biomarkers.
3) The FDA has taken over biomarker qualification.
4) Firms must increase power of clinical trials in order to validate biomarker as well as
the treatment.
Academia
Dr. Stacy Melanson, Clinical Laboratory, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston MA, May 16 2007
Identified two drug metabolism efficacy/toxicity/dosing biomarkers: Warfarin and
Cyclophosphomide.
Dr. Jon Aster, Associate Professor, Department of Pathology, Harvard Medical School, Boston MA,
May 17
Sees intellectual property issues as the main challenge that inhibits the
development of new biomarkers.
Dr. Raju Kucherlapati, Scientific Director of Harvard Partners Center
for Genetics and Genomics, Paul C. Cabot Professor of Genetics, Harvard Medical School, Boston
MA, June 20 2007
The question is interesting but the model is wrong. Hedging with biomarkers is
impossible because it is retrospective. At best it can generate hypotheses for repeat trials.
Pharma companies already use/hunt biomarkers but they don't use them in the
approval process because they have incentives to do just better than the standard of care
in order to get approval and full market access.
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An exception may be Novartis's anti-HIV drug.
American Society of Clinical Oncologists
Dr. Dan Hayes, Clinical Director, Breast Oncology Program, University of Michigan Comprehensive
Cancer Center, Conference Call June 14 2007
1) Biomarkers should go through the same rigorous validation process that drugs go
through. So far, too many have been based on studies of convenience (retrospective).
2) At the same time, there has to be a regulatory driven incentive (carrots, not just
sticks) for developing biomarkers, such as exclusivity and proper reimbursement.
3) In addition, FDA should require DNA banking in clinical trials since this is one of the
missing resources in biomarker "excavation".
Industry
Bob Mulroy, CEO, Merrimack Pharmaceuticals, Cambridge MA, June 18
Bob felt that the research question and the model are highly relevant for the
industry and that the sensitivity analysis answers a key question for pharmaceutical
companies that have been disappointed with biomarker "fishing expeditions".
Since Merrimack's approach is different than that of the pharmaceutical industry
its perspective on the effects of biomarkers and stratification are different. Merrimack is
using a disease molecular model as the basis for its identification of both drug target and
biomarkers. Hence, the development of biomarker is inherent in the development of the
treatment rather than a hedging strategy. One immediate consequence is that there is no
question of biomarker validation as a separate question from drug development. If the
biomarker is not valid than the disease model is wrong and needs to be corrected. A
second immediate consequence is that there is no "stratum success" or "success", but
only "stratum success". The third immediate consequence is that Merrimack can reap the
benefits of smaller clinical trials and shorter time to market. The largest consequence,
however, is that Merrimack sees stratification increasing rather than shrinking its market
size. While the industry views stratification within a predefined disease space, Merrimack
redefines the disease space at the molecular level and across traditional disease
boundaries. For example, its first drug is targeting solid tumors with a specific molecular
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signature whether they originate from breast, colon or other tissues. By redefining the
indication based on the molecular level Merrimack's first drug is targeting a huge stratum
across different empiricalally defined diseases.
Dr. Jeff Hanke, Oncology CSO AstraZeneca, Waltham MA, June 25 2007
Drivers of stratified medicine:
1) There is a push from payers towards stratification through the need to show clinically
significant improvements over standard of care.
2) It is easier to get approved where there is an incumbent due to FDA policies.
3) Diseases are being reclassified molecularly across traditional definitions and so it is
more reclassification than stratification.
4) It is possible to agree upfront with the FDA to stratify retrospectively (but not trivial).
Caveats:
1) Retrospective markers that are based on small samples can be misleading (e.g. EGFR
mutation).
a) Don't deny patients based on a retrospective marker. Enrich but don't exclude.
b) Response doesn't necessarily correlate with survival (e.g. Iressa and EGFR
mutation).
Inhibitors:
2) Separate track of approval for the diagnostic.
3) Today there is no motivation to do a stratification trial for Iressa since it would also
be relevant for Tarceva. Hence, it is impossible to use the diagnostic as a gate keeper.
The Iressa Case:
1) The data about the EGFR mutation came as a result of the trials and when Phase III
was already underway.
2) In a larger sample the mutation was less predictive of survival than other markers and
that is why they never tried to stratify based on the EGFR mutation.
Dr. Gualberto Ruano, CEO Genomas, Conference Call June 29 2007
There are incentives for stratified medicine tfor non-pharmaceutical companies
such as Genomas. He sees an opportunity to stratify approved blockbuster drugs, such as
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cholesterol lowering drugs, for toxicity. The focus is on toxicity that can be observed
fairly quickly in order to shorten clinical trials and consequently, time to market.
Dr. Anthony Boral, Millennium Pharmaceuticals. Conference Call Aug 2 2007
1. Incentives:
a. Smaller and shorter phase III trials.
b. Better efficacy, competition.
2. Disincentives:
a. Linking a pre-clinical biomarker to outcomes proved to be difficult.
b. Price inflexibility makes post market stratification hard to justify.
3. Conclusion:
Non-response biomarkers may be more valuable than response biomarkers,
especially in oncology where the efficacy bar is low and toxicity is high. It is hard to
exclude patients unless it is almost certain that they will not respond.
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